



Today, on the 18th of May 1966, complying with the 
invitation contained in the Resolution of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations of December 16th 1965, which ratifies the 
Consensus of the Committee of Twenty-four of October 16th 1964, 
the United Kingdom and Spain are ready to start negotiations on 
the Status and situation of the Territory of Gibraltar. 
The mandate of the 
United Nations. 
The international mandate we are here to comply 
with, deals with the problem of applying to Gibraltar the prin-
ciples contained in the Declaration on the granting of independence 
to colonial countries and peoples. This problem had been raised 
by Great Britain as one to be solved on the basis of self-deter 
mination for the present inhabitants of what she considers to 
be the Colony of Gibraltar. However, the United Nations did 
not admit that Gibraltar can be unilaterally decolonized by Great 
Britain in that manner. Instead, the United Nations have invited 
the Governments of Spain and Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
to "undertake without delay conversations in order to find, in ac-
cordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
a negotiated solution, in keeping with the provisions of resolution 
1. 514 (XV), taking duly into account the opinions expressed by 
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the members of the Committee and bearing in mind the interests 
of the population of the territory". 
Thus, the United Nations have not admitted a 
unilateral solution and have fundamentally recognized the 
existence of a serious problem between the two countries, 
the solution of which they entrust to a dialogue between 
them. In these circumstances, Spain considers that today 
is a date of extreme and even historical importance for our 
two peoples, because it enables us to attempt to solve 
permanently a problem that has seriously disturbed relations 
between Spain and England for 262 years. 
We must now define and analyse objectively the 
pro bl em of Gibraltar. 
In this analysis I wish to lay aside all pathos and 
emotion. In spite of the enormous importance of this question 
for Spain and of the very deep feelings it arouses, I wish to 
speak objectively and calmly, and to try and focus a clear light 
of understanding on this complex and often-debated subject. 
I intend, firstly, to attempt to define the structure 
of the problem in its three main aspects - military, demographic 
and economic - and to describe the currents of forces affecting 
British interest to which they have given rise. Then, I will 
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explain the significance for Spain of Gibraltar and its evolution 
through history, and the repercussion on our country of its 
political, military, human and socio-economic aspects. 
Next, I will refer to the grave "frontier question" 
raised by Gibraltar, and finally, I shall present the formula of 
the solution offered by Spain and some conclusions which may 
perhaps contain some surprises for many of you. 
Although it is entirely obvious, I would like to 
emphasize that my colleagues and I are here to explain the Spanish 
points of view, clearly and honestly, and that all we ask for is to 
be heard with the same attention and patience with which we are 
ready to listen to your points of view. We hope that our statements 
will contain nothing offensive, because it has been our firm in-
tention to frame them in a spirit of equanimity and friendship. 
A legal title and its 
limitations. 
For us the Rock is above all a British military 
Base installed in Spain. The legal title conferring this Base is 
Article 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht of 1 713, fully ratified in 
various subsequent Conventions and especially by the Treaty 
of Versailles of 1783. 
It is necessary to point out that Great Britain lacks 
any other title to justify her presence in Gibraltar. 
The right of conquest cannot be alleged for the 
Rock, as this was occupied during the War of the Spanish 
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Succession on behalf of a possible King of Spain - the Pretender 
to the Spanish Crown, Archduke Charles of Austria - by an 
allied force, carried by the British ships of Admiral Rooke, 
which was composed of German, Dutch, Irish, British and even 
Spanish troops under the command of the German-Austrian 
Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt; who, on occupying the Rock, 
acted as the representative and plenipotentiary of the Austrian 
Pretender, appointed Spanish authorities and later received 
the Archduke in triumph as King of Spain. So true is it that 
Gibraltar was originally involved exclusively in a conflict 
between Pretenders to the Spanish throne, that Queen Anne of 
England made a statement, published on May 1st 1705 by Lord 
Peterborough, in which she indicated that she was sending 
her forces to the Peninsula to uphold the just claim of the 
House of Austria to the Throne of Spain, and not to take 
possession of any place in the name of Her Britannic Majesty. 
(General Collection of Treaties, Vol. IV, p. 336) 
It is evident that the only rights possessed by 
Great Britain in this matter are those which derive from a 
correct interpretation of Article 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht. 
And Article 10 - I apologize for briefly repeating 
facts which are already well known - contains not only a state-
ment of the rights conceded to Great Britain in respect of the 
Rock but also, concurrently, some limitations which may be 
summarized as follows: 
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(1) Territorial limitations 
Gibraltar is ceded only in respect of the Town, 
Castle, port, fortifications and fortress as they were in 1704 
- the date of British occupation - and there is absolutely no 
inclusion of other territories. 
(2) Legal limitations 
The cession is made "without any territorial 
jurisdiction". 
(3) Economic limitations 
All communication by land and all commerce 
between the Town and the surrounding territory were forbidden. 
( 4) Limitations based on military reasons. 
For security reasons, the residence in Gibraltar 
of certain classes of persons was prohibited. 
(5) Limitation as to its future disposal 
It was stipulated that Great Britain could neither 
grant, sell, or otherwise alienate Gibraltar without first offering 
Spain the right to recover it. 
All these limitations, to be found in the full text, 
which is still in force, of Article 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht 
have not only been ignored but specifically violated, and this 
has impaired the legal basis of the British presence on the 
Rock. 
The anatomy of the 
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With reference to Gibraltar considered as a Military 
Base the violations have consisted: firstly, in the invasion of 
adjacent territories which had not been ceded by the Treaty of 
Utrecht and which still belong to the absolute sovereignty of Spain. 
Secondly, in the British expansion over territorial waters in 
the Bay of Algeciras which are equally under Spanish sovereignty. 
And, finally, in an aspect which touches on the very essence of 
the Base, as this was ceded strictly to Great Britain, in the context 
of a bilate1 ll Anglo-Spanish relationship - in which some Spanish 
interests were or might be involved - but not in order to serve 
1.~e ends of an International Organization to which Spain does not 
belong. And it is generally known that, de facto if not de jure, 
the Base of Gibraltar is now serving the purposes of NATO - an 
Organization in which Spanish interests are not directly involved. 
b) An artificially cons-
tituted human group. 
Gibraltar is also a human aggregate, and this is 
another aspect of the problem. Great Britain"' s pretension is 
today that the inhabitants of the Rock should decide upon its 
future, thus linking by the method of self-determination the 
territory with its inhabitants; this basically alters the original 
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terms of the situation, which was that of a bilateral relationship 
between England and Spain, but from which, however, Spain has 
been ousted for the benefit of a third party. But this third party 
is not valid because, firstly, Gibraltar is merely a military 
Base and a Base can only belong, either to the country that oc-
cupies it or to the country in whose territory it stands. Anything 
else would be as absurd as, for instance, to maintain that the 
American Base at Guantanamo, in Cuba, should stop being 
American, without reverting to Cuba either, but should have 
its fate decided by an alleged population residing there. Hong 
Kong presents a similar, though not formally identical situation. 
The Observer expressed the opinion, on July 10th 1949, that 
there could be no question of preparing the island for independence, 
as Hong Kong should either continue being British, or else 
revert to China. 
Secondly, there is no real or profound link between 
the inhabitants of Gibraltar and the territory, because, apart 
from the fact that the authentic population of the Rock was 
obliged to abandon it by reason of the military occupation, the 
later inhabitants are a product of a British political operation 
aimed at successively fabricating and refabricating the so-called 
population with ethnical groups uprooted from their original 
countries; they are inhabitants without any real political identity 
of their own or any real autonomy as such, and .they constitute 
a demographic group which is entirely subsidiary to a Base 
enclosed in a territory of two square miles, almost all of 
it a military zone and Crown property. How can this group 
be considered a true population capable of political self-
determination and with a right to dispose of a territory which 
belongs to it neither historically nor legally? 
The London Times of January 4th 1946 frankly 
pointed out these characteristics when it said the following 
about the inhabitants of the Rock: 
"A people which gains its livelihood largely by 
importing a commodity and selling it to someone who is 
on the spot or who comes to fetch it, be it tons of coal 
or a packet of cigarettes and a bottle of beer to a soldier, 
or sailor, has not hitherto developed racial or national 
characteristics as do tillers of the soil or fishers of the 
sea. " 
c) An economy based on 
smuggling 
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Thirdly, the problem of Gibraltar consists of an 
economy which sprang up under the shadow of a British military 
force planted on Spanish soil, and which in itself is inevitably 
bound to raise problems, for there can be no normal economy 
in a military Base with a small area and which has no resources 
of its own, no agriculture or industry and whose trade is 
Dynamics of the 
problem. 
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principally contraband. W. C. Atkinson (Fortnightly Review 
February 1951 page 90) wrote with sincerity: 
"As for smuggling, there has never been any 
attempt on the English side to conceal that for long this 
was the chief industry of the Rock" s inhabitants, including 
the garrison. " 
The objective description we have given is the 
true anatomy of the problem of Gibraltar, a military Base 
with an essentially unsound legal foundation, an artificial 
population without any genuine autonomy, and an economy 
partly sustained by unnatural and illegal means; all of 
which reveals the importance of the question of Gibraltar 
and the urgent need for a solution. 
These three aspects of the question - the Base, 
the inhabitants and the economy - have produced a set 
of vital problems and an interplay of British and Spanish 
interests that lie at the very root of the question which 
brings us here today, at the request of the United Nations. 
a) A Fortress transformed 
into a Base 
Firstly, Gibraltar has experienced a profound 
evolution through hi story. Ih 1 713 Spain ceded a fortress 
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from which some guns with a limited range merely defended a 
British Base of great strategic importance which was destined 
one day to become a key point in the communications of the 
I 
British Empire; but the great political and technical changes 
of our times - which have seen Empires disappear, brought 
forth new alliances and World Wars and created new nations, 
and above all transformed every aspect of the old military 
art and the principles of strategy - have also radically changed 
the nature of Gibraltar as a Base. 
With this background of strategic change, the Rock 
was bound to play its part in vast alliances and it became a 
pivot for collective military operations on a world scale. Its 
purely relative value then became even more evident, that is 
to say, the indissoluble relationship between Gibraltar and 
its natural geographical environment, namely, Spain. 
Military efficiency de-
pendent on Spain. 
The II World War laid bare the essential problem of 
Gibraltar, without any possible euphemism or insincerity. 
It could be seen sharply and clearly. The statesmen and sol-
diers of Great Britain and her allies realized that a hostile 
attitude on the part of Spain could nullify this Rock, which was 
indispensable to the whole allied military machine, and that the 
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results might be catastrophic. Indeed, during those sombre days 
of 1940 when the greater part of Continental Europe was in enemy 
hands, Gibraltar became, in the words of Field Marshall Lord 
Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, " ..• the sole 
remaining foothold in Europe". 
Thanks to Spanish neutrality and Spain" s diplomatic 
resistence to the Axis powers, this foothold of Gibraltar was 
fully efficient as a key piece of the Allied war strategy; and, 
as General Eisenhower wrote in his Memoirs, "made possible 
the invasion of northwest Africa", a decisive Allied military 
operation of which he said: "If the Spaniards should take ho stile 
action against us immediate! y upon the beginning of landing 
operations, it would be practically impossible to secure any 
land-based fighter craft for use in northern Africa and 
would prevent our use of the Strait of Gibraltar". 
This operation was carried out, as Sir Arthur 
Bryant reminds us, "with nothing to protect its flank and rear 
but the Rock of Gibraltar and its minute airstrip". 
This was the most severe and crippling blow 
inflicted on the enemies of Great Britain, as Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick 
- who was Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office and 
in the confidence of Mr. Ern e st Bevin - states in his Memoirs, 
"The Inner Circle" (MacMillan & Co. London 1959), when he 
tells of his interview with Goering in the Nuremberg prison and 
a) Au tho ritati ve 
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gives us L.~ German mar shall" s opinion on Hitler,. s terrible handicap 
in not having at his disposal Spain and Gibraltar to prevent the later 
Allied penetration of Africa. The fact is that Gibraltar had had a 
free hand thanks to Spanish neutrality, which enabled it to develop 
its full potential as a military Base. Sir Anthony Eden referred 
to such a problem many years later when he said in the House of 
Commons on July 29th 1954 that in th e modern world n a tion s "do 
not want foreign troops on the ir t e rritory" and that what is ne e d e d 
is "a Base that works, and not a beleaguered garrison". 
The many testimoni e s to th e fact that Gibraltar w as 
able to function thanks to Spair1 and Spanish neutrality, which we 
find in the words or works of men like Winston Churchill a nd 
Franklin Roosevelt, are an irrefutable proo.f that the problem of 
Gibraltar as a viable Base exists and cannot be solved without Spain. 
This fact must have been gloomily impressed on the 
mind of the Governor of the Rock. When G eneral Marshall visit· 
Gibraltar with Mr. Churchill during th e II \Vorld Wa r, thert' 
occurred an incident that the veteran British s..tat 'sma n d esc ri b -·d 
later in his Memoirs with his usual eloquence. I a polo g i. ze h, .. · 
the length of thi ..., quotation which I think is worth whil e : 
"We did not leave Gibraltar for Algiers unti l the 
following afternoon. There was therefore an opportunity to 
show Ge: er al Marshall the Rock, and we all mad e a few hour s ,. 
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pilgrimage, and inspected the new distillery which assures the 
fortress a permanent supply of fresh water, and various important 
guns, some hospitals, and a large number of troops. I finally 
went below to see the Governor" s special pet, the new Rock 
gallery, cut deep into the rock, with its battery of eight quick-
firing guns commanding the isthmus and the neutral ground 
between Britain and Spain. An immense amount of work had 
been put into this, and it certainly seemed, as we walked along 
it, that whatever perils Gibraltar might have to fear, attack 
from the mainland was no longer one of them. The Governor" s 
pride in his achievement was shared by his British visitors. It 
was not until we said good-bye upon the flying-boat that General 
Marshall somewhat hesitatingly observed, "I admired your 
gallery, but we had one like it at Corregidor. The Japanese 
fired their artillery at the rock several hundred feet above it, 
and in two or three days blocked it off with an immense bank 
of rubble." (Winston Churchill" s Memoirs, The Hinge of Destiny 
Chap. XL.) 
The War, in fact, provided supreme evidence that the 
Rock was in the very centre of a total revolution in the conception of 
military Bases in foreign lands; because today we can no longer 
imagine a Base isolated from the gee-political environment around 
it, or indifferent to the neighbouring territory. Only by the 
friendship and cooperation of the adjoining country, and by 




goodwill, can a Base in foreign lands be of any use. The old idea 
of a military Base installed by a unilateral decision, and isolated 
like a "ghetto", has given way to the idea of zones of bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation, and of great strategic spaces shared 
by common consent and agreement in the service of common 
objectives. 
Behind this doctrine there is a specific reality which 
lies at the end of Gibraltar" s long historical evolution: that 
Gibraltar can only be used with full efficiency if it can rely on 
Spanish cooperation. The fact that Gibraltar has in practice been 
attached to NATO objectives in recent days, gives a greater emphas 
to this truth. 
In so far as the second aspect is concerned, the 
inhabitants of Gibraltar have also become a problematic factor. 
At present, this human group is creating some urgent problems 
for Great Britain, and is demanding the solution of difficulties 
that arise inevitably from its having been artificially planted on 
the Rock and from the equally artificial character of its way of 
livelihood, economy, etc. It is evident that these inhabitants, 
whose necessary environment lies beyond the Rock, so that many 
of them have fixed their residence and commercial activities on 
Spanish soil; and whose economic life is bound up intimately 
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with the economy of the neighbouring region, cannot be reconciled 
to any restrictions that may be applied by Spain, even if these 
consist merely in the strict application of her current Laws. 
It must be remembered that the way of life of a great number of 
the inbahitants has been based up to the present on the benevolent 
interpretation by Spain of the articles of the Treaty of Utrecht. 
The Spanish Government understands that all this constitutes 
a problem for Great Britain because, without any doubt, it will 
be very difficult and expensive to protect their interests. But 
we cannot admit that this protection should be effected at the 
expense of Spanish interests. 
c) The crisis of Gibraltar"' s 
economy. 
Finally, there is the economy of Gibraltar, the 
port of Gibraltar, and a Gibraltarian commerce that have also 
historically evolved. They would have evolved legitimately if 
the limitations to which Gibraltar was subjected by the Treaty 
of Utrecht and by Spanish laws, had been modified by an agreement 
between England and Spain. This did not take place and an 
illegal commerce was resorted to. At present this Gibraltarian 
economy is in danger of paralysis, and consequently requi·res Great 
Britain to undertake a complete revision of its structure. 
d) The "proud Fortress" a 
thorn in Spanish flesh. 
The currents of forces we have described lead up to 
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a fact which should not be ignored merely because it touches on 
a question of sentiment. Gibraltar is not only a Base with its 
attendant difficulties, but also a symbol for Great Britain: "The 
Proud Fortress", symbolic of British power and of her glorious 
naval and military traditions. We realize this and we understand 
that in raising this question we are touching a sensitive and 
painful area. For this reason we believe that we ought to arrive 
at an agreement by which neither of the two nations should feel 
humiliated or resentful. For it is necessary to understand that, 
for Spain, Gibraltar has also been a symbol: of a series of iniquities 
and affronts; there is the memory of the way in which it was taken 
from us, the humiliations we have suffered, the intolerable poli-
tical military and economic servitude that were imposed on us in 
times of national prostration. Such memories are lasting. It is 
the only foreign colony in a European nation. One can speak 
about Gibraltar in the words used recently by the eminent 
British historian Arnold Toynbee: 
11 Gibraltar? It is a thorn in Spain" s flesh. Would the 
British people like to see a Russian or Chinese fortress at 
Land's End or in the Channel Islands?'' 
Up till now we have described a series of problems 
created by the historical evolution of the Rock of Gibraltar and 
the play of forces which has taken place around it, problems 
which affect the interests of Great Britain, and which condition 
radically the viability of Gibraltar as a military Base, as a 
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human aggregate and as an economy. 
But for Spain also the pas sing of the years has made 
Gibraltar into a focus of very serious wrongs, a centre of per-
nicious influence on the neighbouring regions and a place of 
friction and discord; in short, a disturbing and negative element 
in Anglo-Spanish relations. It is permissible to ask if the English 
people fully understand this reality, which will probably surprise 
many who are not acquainced with its various aspects. 
Consequences for Spain 
a) Violation of territorial 
integrity 
For Spaniards, Gibraltar remains fundamentally 
a foreign Base on national territory, a foreign body in our own 
organism, serving alien interests that often clash with those of 
Spain. It represents the amputation of our territory, a break 
in the continuity of our coasts, a sort of military wedge and 
obstacle in the communications between two seas and the relations 
between two continents. Gibraltar is situated in one of the vital 
parts of Spanish geography, and it has always deeply troubled 
the people of Spain who over the centuries have sought to retain 
it, or recover it if it was in alien hands. So true is this, that 
in one of the most important clauses in the political testament 
of Queen Isabella, at a historical moment when both the idea 
and the national unity of Spain had crystallized, she commanded 
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her descendants to retain Gibraltar inflexibly and forbade them 
ever to give away or dispose of it. 
b) Spain interfered with. 
For Spain Gibraltar is not only a territorial amputation. 
It has produced a constant interference in Spanish affairs, both in 
her home politics and foreign policies. It has interfered, firstly 
in Spain" s own defensive system, sometimes demanding the 
dismantlement of neighbouring military installations, as when 
in 1810 -with the excuse that they should be prevented from falling 
into French hands - the Governor of Gibraltar, General Campbell, 
levelled the Spanish forts of San Felipe and Santa Barbara that 
protected the neighbouring town of La Linea from the Fortress of 
Gibraltar. The war with France ended but Great Britain continued 
to oppose the rebuilding of the Forts. Nearly a century later 
- in 1898, when Spain was fighting an ill-matched war with the 
United States and pas sing through a serious and difficult time in 
her history; when she had lost her overseas provinces, at perhaps 
her weakest moment - Great Britain once again insisted on Spanish 
disarmament, objecting to the installation of artillery in the 
neighbouring Spanish zone of the Bay of Algeciras. (Diplomatic 
notes from August 9 to December 9th of 1898). Spain was alone 
at that critical moment of her history, as alone as England in 1940. 
Behind this specific British action we may perceive 
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Britain"' s permanent desire to establish round Gibraltar a military 
neutralized zone, subject to the influence of the Rock and even 
to a possible occupation. The British Press towards the end of 
the 19th century and commencement of the 20th often admitted this 
objective (The Times, 4-XII-1899. Daily Telegraph, 29-III-1901, 
The Sun, 13-II-1901) and in the House of Commons a Member, 
Mr. Gibson Bowles on June 13th 1901 quoted the opinion of the 
Military experts in the same sense. This British preoccupation 
was so vivid that in 1905 the then Foreign Secretary Lord Landsdowne 
suggested to the Spanish Minister in London, Marques de Villaurru-
tia, that both countries should reach an agreement by which Spain 
should guarantee Great Britain the possession of Gibraltar in 
exchange for a guarantee given by Great Britain of Spain"' s 
possession of the Balearic Islands, a concept which from the 
p oint of view of the dignity and unity of the Spanish Nation was 
tantamount to guaranteeing us the possession of the Province of 
Madrid (Marques de Villaurrutia, "Palique Diplomatico" page 137). 
The Ex-Governor of Gibraltar General Sir Charles Harrington on 
February 13th, 1939, explained to the Royal Empire Society, with 
perhaps excessive sincerity, this constant British pretension: 
"It is the area round Gibraltar which is of more 
importance in view of the range of modern guns. I would 
like to see the neutral ground between us and Spain, now some 
300 yards, extended to an arc of some 25 miles from Tarifa 
via Castellar to the Mediterranean to make both Gibraltar 
and the Royal Calpe Hunt safe." 
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And even in the Teheran conference in November 1943 
where the Allies discussed the gravest military and political 
problems of the Second World War, the question of Gibraltar was 
touched upon, and the possibility of broadening the Gibraltar te-
rritory was discussed, as Andre Fontaine reports in his "Histoire 
de la Guerre Froide". (Fayard, Paris 19 66, page, 2 22). 
This interference carried out from the Rock in such 
a fundamental question as Spain" s own defences was even to affect 
our foreign policy. The British Government, for instance in the 
middle of last century, intervened in our North African policy, 
attempting to condition and limit the Spanish Government" s 
decisions for the defence of its interests in that region, with the 
argument that those decisions would endanger the security of the 
Fortress of Gibraltar. 
c) Gratuitous risk 
for Spain and the 
diplomatic reaction 
Lastly, as a military base, Gibraltar implies a 
constant danger to Spain. The Rock has undergone many historical 
changes, from its days as one more British fortress in the 18th 
century, down to the present day when it has become a place of 
international military cooperation in which we do not share; and 
these changes have turned it into a hazard for the whole national 





Gibraltar Base caused Spain to suffer loss of lives and property 
on the occasion of the second World War - a war of conventional · 
weapons-, and if even in times of peace Spain has received 
damage during manoeuvres and military concentrations on the 
adjoining Rock, it is easy to imagine what Spaniards may have 
to fear from the Base in a nuclear war. And while Spain is 
prepared to accept risks of that kind on account of alliances in 
which Spanish interests are served, she is not prepared to do 
the same for the benefit of interests or alliances that are foreign 
to her, least of all when the prospects of a modern war may 
turn Gibraltar into a sure objective for nuclear weapons. 
The practical attachment of Gibraltar to the service 
of NATO has increased the dangers, and further still, the accusing 
finger of an entire military bloc which rivals that of NATO has 
heightened that danger, by suggesting at the United Nations that, 
in not purely and simply demanding the elimination of the Gibraltar 
Base, Spain was voluntarily assuming the risks which the Base 
implies. 
The Spanish Government, aware of this new and 
sombre menace hanging over all of Spain, has found itself obliged 
to declare in unmistakable terms that as far as we are concerned 
Gibraltar is not a base in the service of NATO. As a result, on 
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January 20th 1966 all the members of the Atlantic Alliance, except 
Great Britain, were sent a Note in which, after declaring that the 
status of Gibraltar - which is at the present moment under discussion -
had been bilaterally laid down by Spain and Great Britain, our country 
could not regard Gibraltar as a Base in the service of the Atlantic 
Alliance, and was accordingly not prepared to grant the facilities 
depending on this country for its use by the members of that Alliance. 
Spain moreover indicated that she viewed with the greatest reserve 
any military, naval or air exercises and operations, that might be 
carried out with support at Gibraltar and in which a part was played 
by countries other than : Great Britain. 
We are aware that this Spanish reaction, imposed by 
the real circumstances of the Gibraltar problem, was fully 
discussed at the NATO Council. The individual replies that 
Spain has been receiving have been on the whole positive towards 
my country"' s thesis. 
The Soviet affirmation that Gibraltar is being used 
in a massive degree by NATO, that is, by Great Britain"' sallies, 
was no fantasy, and the decision which led Spain to send the 
Atlantic Alliance countries the Note of January 20th was thus fully 
justified. 
In the first place, the British Government not only 
makes use of Gibraltar waters that do not belong to her, but also 
uses for military purposes the airport built in a zone of Spanish 
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territory which was never ceded, which is occupied by Great 
Britain without any title whatsoever, and which, in view of its neutral 
character, should never have been made to serve military purpos"'" 
And that use of it, in addition to violating our sovereignty, frequently 
violates an air space which is also Spanish. 
The massive use of 
Spanish air space . 
In order to use that airport, England applies to Spain 
for overflight authorizations in respect of military aircraft pro-
ceeding from the British Isles, with a frequency which is reflected 
in the following facts: From November 23rd 1965 down to May 
5th 1966, that is, in less than half a year, the British Embassy 
in Madrid has requested the Spanish Government, in 61 Notes 
Verbales, to authorize 274 overflights by machines of the Royal 
Air F:::>rce in our air space, and all these authorizations were 
granted. 
But it is not only the British Armed Forces that 
have made use of the Gibraltar military facilities. From January 
1st 19 66 down to the sending of the Note mentioned, the Gibraltar 
airport was used by about twenty military aircraft of the United 
States, and from January 20th to the beginning of May by only 
twelve. The rate of arrival of American aircraft at Gibraltar 
has fallen roughly from one a day to one a week. Fourteen aircraft 
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of the Royal Canadian Air Force operated from the Rock through 
February 22 to 26, on February 28 and March 27; that is to say 
after the Ottawa Government had received the Spanish Note of 
January 20th 1966 which explained our position in respect of 
a Gibraltar placed at the service of an Organization to which 
Spain does not belong. One French military aircraft, on January 
21st 1966, and two Dutch aircraft on January 28th last, also 
wished to use it, with previous Spanish authorization, but these 
applications had to be replied to negatively, in terms of the 
arguments set forth in the Note of January 20th already mentioned. 
Na vies of countries other than Great Britain also 
use Gibraltar, which has been called at, in the course of the 
present year, by warships of the United States, Germany, Norway, 
Italy and other NATO countries which, like Holland, make the Rock 
a port of call for their fleets when operating or holding exercises 
in the Mediterranean. 
The Governments of all these countries are now 
perfectly well aware of Spain" s view regarding this mass use of 
the Gibraltar base. Hence it should have caused no surprise when 
the Spanish Government, on January 24th this year, refused to 
grant facilities for operating in Spanish waters to the Italian 
ship "Maria Paolina G", in the service of NATO at the 
Base of La Spezia: or when Spain did not facilitate, on February 
22nd, the telegraph and telephone link-ups to connect Gibraltar 
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with the bases of Brest and Montijo (Lisbon) during the naval 
exercises of the Atlantic Alliance that were held in Portuguese 
waters during last March. 
No matter in what way it may be sought to disguise 
Gibraltar"' s connexion with the Atlantic Organization, the fact 
remains that it exists, as is proved by the presence, on the 
Rock, of the Headquarters of the Admiral Commanding the 
Gibraltar-Mediterranean zone, dependent on the Malta Command, 
and a permanent liaison officer of the United States of America. 
This connexion, moreover, was carefully explained 
by the Minister of Her Britannic Majesty"' s Embassy in Madrid 
to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as is recorded on 
pages 69 to 73 of the Spanish Red Book (English edition), when 
he sought to show that if England remained at Gibraltar it was 
on account of her obligations for collective defence in view 
of the Soviet menace. 
The Soviet Union is right in saying that the Rock 
is linked to the Atlantic Alliance. It is wrong when insinuating 
that this connexion takes place with Spain"' s tacit or explicit 
consent. So opposed is Spain to the use of the Rock for purposes 
other than those which justified its cession in other times, that 
she also formally objects to the provisioning which is periodically 
carried out at Gibraltar by the Russian whaling fleet, some of 
whose ships, in view of the instruments they are equipped with, 
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can scarcely be regarded as ordinary vessels engaged in a peace-
ful commercial pursuit. 
Spanish deference towards 
Britain. A frank notification. 
These circumstances which have been briefly set 
forth made it advisable for the Spanish Government to apply, 
with gradually increasing intensity, the measures that were 
becoming necessary in order to reduce to the greatest possible 
extent the dangers involved in the present military situation of 
the Rock. If that step has not yet been taken, the sole reason 
for whithholding it is a desire to assist the Anglo-Spanish 
conversations which are now opening, and which Spain has tried 
to envelop in an atmosphere of good will and harmony, even at 
the risk of postponing any possible defence against the hazards 
described. Spain hopes that this token of good will may be 
appreciated at its true value by the British Government, which 
the Spanish Ambassador in London informed, on April 20th, 
of the reasons why, in the interest of Anglo -Spanish understanding, 
Great Britain had not been sent a Note similar to those sent to 
the other members of the NATO. 
On receiving for the first time Her Britannic 
Majesty"' s present Ambassador in Madrid on the same day of 
April 20th, I also had occasion to inform him that since receiving 
on February 14th the British acceptance of the holding of the 
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conversations that we commence today, Spain had abstained from 
adopting any fresh measure that could be interpreted, directly or 
indirectly, as aimed against Gibraltar. The revision of our European 
military policy, largely forced on us by the new Gibraltar situation, 
involved, among other things, refusal of authorization for British 
overflights of our air space, a measure which, if adopted, would 
mainly affect British military aircraft bound for Gibraltar. 
As we sit down now at the table, I think it my duty 
as an honourable negotiator to make it perfectly clear that as 
Spain does not accept the militarization carried out by Great 
Britain in the southern part of the former neutral ground, she 
not only is under no obligation to grant permits for overflights 
bound for the Rock, but unless she wishes her silence to be taken 
as tacit consent, she must also oppose the use of that airport by 
military aircraft. 
If that reason were not enough, the dangers which 
the present military significance of Gibraltar involves for my 
country would make it advisable for the Spanish Government to 
refuse authorizations for overflights by British Gibraltar-bound 
planes, as it has refused them to aircraft of other NATO countries. 
Only an Anglo-Spanish agreement on Gibraltar can 
justify Spain" s not putting these measures into effect in the shortest 
possible space of time, as the Spanish Government has in view. 
If I have succeeded in making you understand clearly the spirit in 
which we are describing the problem of Gibraltar as we are so 
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doing, I think you will also easily understand that the measures I 
have mentioned in all honesty are aimed only at protecting 
legitimate Spanish interests and re-establishing the rightful 
and legal situation. 
The consequences for 
a region of Spain: 
a) Military" glacis" 
and economic void. 
But besides all these detriments caused by the 
Military Base and its activity, Gibraltar has rnade a great 
void around itself. This began with the actual demographic void 
on the Rock, which owing to the forced exodus of its original 
Spanish population, declined from the 6. 000 inhabitants it had 
before the occupation, to only 900 in 1721, seventeen years later, 
and to 2. 890 in 1 791, almost a century later -a period in which 
it had not even succeeded in reaching half the population it pos-
sessed in the Spanish period. This brought about the mutilation 
of a Spanish population complex which formerly had its centre 
in Gibraltar and was thus profoundly altered. 
Side by side with the void on the Rock, inhabited 
almost solely by the garrison, a void came into being in the 
neighbouring zone of Spain, not perhaps strictly demographic, 
but certainly in respect of economic life and development. 
The warfare at the foot of the Rock, the sieges and blockades, 
29. 
the British disarmament exactions, in short the military reality, 
which created an area of distrust, anxiety, alarms and external 
interferences, prevented a normal development of the district 
and maintained it in the situation of a real devitalized military 
"glaci s". 
From these two voids, an authentic colonial situation 
was to arise; but not in the sense that might normally be given 
to that expression; in other words, not a colonial situation which 
was confined to the Rock and to which it is now necessary to put 
an end, but a real colonialism exercised outside the Rock and 
upon a zone of Spain and its inhabitants. The process that led 
to this was as follows: 
b) Demography and 
smuggling 
First of all, Great Britain needed to fill her own 
demographic void on the Rock. It was indispensable to procure 
a civilian support for the almost solitary garrison, and this - as 
was outlined when the problem of Gibraltar was briefly sketched -
was achieved through a constant intake of ethnical groups which 
generally came from countries not yet constituted into national 
States. These groups, suddenly cut off from their traditional 
human backgr·ound, and coming from the mo st widely varying 
places, were marked by instability and lack of roots. The l 9th-
century epidemics almost wiped out this group of people several 
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times, and Great Britain, several times also, hastened to recon-
struct it through mass operations of importing and recruiting people 
from those parts of the Mediterranean where the chance of doing 
good business on the Rock, -or else, for instance, of escaping 
the military levies in the times of the Napoleonic wars, - formed 
enticing incentives to go to Gibraltar. 
The statistics for population and professions at 
Gibra~tar in 1834 already sl N the curious nature of this group 
so artificially formed, for the prevailing occupations among these 
improvised inhabitants are those of commercial agents, exchange 
agents, sellers of tobacco and wine, tavern-keepers and the like. 
And in the 1860 census, out of the 12,. 679 inhabitants of Gibraltar, 
132 are given as Government officials, 1, 978 as traders, 5, 565 
as miscellaneous employments, and 4, 994 as unemployed; in other 
words, more than 10, 000 inhabitants had no clearly justHied occu-
pation. 
The Report which the Governor of Gibraltar himself, 
Sir Robert Gardiner, drew up for Lord Palmerston on the inhabitants 
of the Rock and their growth, contains a sincere analysis of this 
demographic phenomenon which was to have so many consequences 
for the future of Gibraltar: 
"The excess of population has its rise in the increase 
of smuggling; aliens having flocked to the Fortress in vast numberi 
to pursue that trade, since it was made a Colony." 
Later, he adds: 
"If such promised to be the result, it is still a question 
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for the Imperial Government to decide, whether the general 
interests of England, and of the fair British trader, should 
be sacrificed to promote those of the persons who, for the 
most part, have but a footing here, to pass contraband goods 
into Spain. " 
This aggregate of people, assembled throughout 
the years in a way so opposed to the normal biological increase 
of natural populations, has been brought in and taken out again by 
Great Britain whenever necessary,and the last time it occurred 
was the great exodus of the Second World War - when there were 
some 18, 000 Gibraltarians resident on the Rock -, to which Lord 
Merrivale referred in his recent speech of March 9th 1966, when 
he stated: 
"In 1940, 16, 700 men over 45, women and children 
were evacuated to this country from Gibraltar, and by 19 51 
repatriation was complete for all those Gibraltarians who had 
homes to go back to !1 
c) A non-viable political 
organization. 
Naturally enough, this collective group had never 
possessed a political being of its own, nor had Great Britain attached 
any political importance or standing to its components. This could 
not have been otherwise, in view of the character, essentially 
subsidiary to the military base, which it has possessed. Its basic 
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nature has been clearly recognized by W. A. Ebsworth in a study 
on Gibraltar and its problems published in "The Quarterly Review " 
for April 1951(Vol.289, No. 588), in which he states: 
"The relationships between the Services and civilians 
1s of unusual importance in so small a community, and everything 
possible must always be done to improve it. Each party depends 
on the other. Although the Services say emphatically that there 
are too many civilians in Gibraltar, few would go so far as to 
contend that there should be none at all; while for the civilians, 
their very existence depends on the Services. If there were no 
garrison Gibraltar would not remain a British Colony for long, 
and if once the frontier with Spain were to disappear, its trade 
would dwindle to nothing. " 
The characteristics of a necessary political dependence 
and real lack of autonomy was also brought out in the article as 
follows: 
"Politically Gibraltar has developed s lowly, and it 
is natural that this should be the case. From time to time 
the local Press will protest that government in the Fortress 
is not democratic. Of course it is not democratic in the 
accepted way in which a modern State is democratic! A 
fortress must be ruled with authority, and to talk about 
"a democratic fortress" is a contradiction in terms. If we 
refer to the history of Gibraltar we remind ourselves that it 
is not, like other colonies, a civilian settlement in which 
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military authority rightly keeps in the background, but it 
is a military fortress into which a civilian community has 
made its way because catering for the needs of the garrison 
and trading under its protection are lucrative propositions." 
d) Gibraltar has no 
labour force of its 
own. 
A human group which has not even been able to consti-
tute a solid, rooted population with permanent interests,or an 
essentially autonomous political entity, was also incapable of 
creating its own labour force. This incapacity is bound up 
with the situation and has become typica4 even nowadays, 
for the inhabitants of the Rock, of whom a British daily, the 
Manchester Guardian of May 11th 1950, said: "The Gibraltarian 
has an innate objection to manual work, preferring the "white 
collar,. or the "white apron: " 
At that time also, a labour population had to be 
imported. After an effort to provide one by the use of convicts 
had failed, it had to be looked for in Spain, because Spain is 
Gibraltar s natural space. The Rock became an absorption-
point for labour, not only from the immediate vicinity but also 
from the provinces of southern Spain. English recruiting agents 
operated at great distances from the Rock, and even in our own 
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days, in 1945, a British Consul at Cadiz caused an incident when 
he had advertisements offering work in Gibraltar published. 
Throughout long periods of time, this absorption went on 
attracting into the zone of the Campo groups of persons uprooted 
from the regions of their birth, who approached the Rock in the 
hope of getting jobs there. This created a real colonial situation, 
since the Campo de Gibraltar was becoming peopled with workers 
who depended on employers across the frontier, and it was these 
employers who dictated the conditions of work. In turn, as 
almost the sole activity of the Rock" s inhabitants was illicit trade 
over this zone, it did much to deprive the region of sound 
economic business, by keeping it in a condition as closely as 
possible resembling that of a mere labour pool at Gibraltar .... s 
diposal. 
The development of works and installations on the 
Rock gradually increased the number of Spanish workers, and at 
the end of the 19th century the figure rose rapidly from about 2, 500 
or 3, 000 to 6, 500 or 7, 000 when the great harbour works of the 
town and the installations of the modern Base were carried out, 
and above all, when the tunnels that perforate the Rock were under 
construction. These were also the years of economic depression 
in Spain - even those when Spanish defence works in the zone 
were paralysed by British imposition -, and labour resorted 
rapidly and in mass to Gibraltar, which thus had at its disposal 
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an entire region which served it as a veritable colony. The 
other great increase of the Spanish labour force occurred with 
the second World War, when the workers that went in from Spain 
every day reached 13, 000. As we have seen, the vast majority 
- 16. 700 - of the 18, 000 resident Gibraltarians were evacuated, 
and thus the Spaniards, during those years, were the real population 
of the Rock, where they kept up its entire working activity under 
the difficulties and risks inherent in a war, and made a decisive 
contribution to British interests at that time. 
e) Colonial exploitation 
of the workers. 
This labour force, the real muscle of Gibraltar's 
life, has worked under a regime for which "colonial" is the 
only fitting word. Wages have been fixed at caprice, the 
working hours have reached 90 and more a week, holiday periods 
did not exist, social insurance and family care have been ignored 
and when the first trade unions were set up in Gibraltar, the 
Spanish workers were forbidden to belong to them on equal 
terms, so that even union protection was denied. There were 
periods when part of their wages was paid in kind, and when that 
was no longer possible, a system was used by which a portion 
of the workers' wages consisted purely and simply of goods 
for smuggling into Spain. And when the Spanish Government, 
for elementary reasons of economic protection and dignity, 
imposed restrictions on this illicit traffic, protests arose 
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in the British press (letter from Lt. - Gen. Martin to the 
Daily Telegraph, 26 August 1954) and even in the British 
Parliament a debate was staged on February 13th 1956, in 
which the hon. Member Kenneth Robinson criticized a series 
of measures taken by Spain, one of which, to his apparent 
surprise and displeasure, was that "the Spanish workers can 
no longer take goods out of Gibraltar as they used to do before", 
and that that they were "moreover forced to change part of their 
wages, I think the greater part, on the frontier at the official 
rate, 11 which the speaker considered ''much less favourable to 
them than the rate they can get at any tobacconist" s in Gibraltar, 
for I understand that all tobacco shops in Gibraltar are also 
unofficial moneychanging offices. 11 
But the Spanish workers, the real active population 
of Gibraltar, have never been able to reside in Gibraltar because 
the British laws forbid it. Every day they have had to go back 
across the border from the territory where they left the results 
of their daily effort. They are the exiles of Gibraltar, the 
historical pariahs of the town, who have had no voice in the 
affairs of Gibraltar; they are truly the "other" Gibraltar 
population, whom nobody mentions, of whom nothing is said 
when the future of the Rock is discussed, but who are there just 
the same; and the daily life oi Gibraltar, at least nowadays, 
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depends upon them. Behind them, in the adjacent Spanish zone, 
are their families, forming a demographic group of as many 
as forty or fifty thousand, upon whom, I repeat, a real colonialism 
has operated. 
These facts make it quite clear that in face of 
the vacuum created by the military presence of Great Britain on 
the Rock, a demographic reality has arisen -inhabitants of the 
Town, Spanish workers and families of the Campo- upon which 
a colonial situation has operated and which calls for considera-
tion at the moment of examining the problem of Gibraltar and 
its future. 
f) Prosperity at 
Spain,. s expense. 
Lastly, Gibraltar is a permanent source of economic 
harm to Spain. Since its activities rest upon the abnormal 
demographic situation which has just been analysed, the Gibraltar 
economy was necessarily bound to operate through illegal channels. 
Thus Gibraltar has been a veritable cancer applied to a part of 
Spain,. s flesh, operating as it does fundamentally through 
contraband. 
This assertion is proved by a mass of Spanish 
and British documents, to which reference is made in the recent 
Spanish "Red Book". An ample British bibliography, too, has 
accumulated in the course of the years with books such as Captain 
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F. Sayer" s "History of Gibraltar" (Chapman and Hall, London 
1865); G. T. Garratt" s "Gibraltar and the Mediterranean" 
(Jonathan Cape, London 1939); J. Howe" s "The Gibraltarian, 
the origin and development of the population of Gibraltar from 
1704", published in 1951; and others. A passage from the last-
named work is exceptionally telling: 
"There has been and probably always will be 
smuggling from Gibraltar. Anyone, local or English, who 
could say he or she had never broken a revenue regulation 
deserves a halo!" 
g) Smuggling as a 
weapon in commercial 
policy. 
Already the Report sent to Lord Palmerston by 
Sir Robert Gardiner, Governor of Gibraltar, and published 
in 18 56, examined the pro bl em of smuggling and touched on 
a vital point for Spain in this illicit trade. Gardiner wrote: 
"We believe that Spain could beneficial! y lower 
her tariff to a scale that would render smuggling unprofitable. 
But Spain cannot do that yet. 11 
And he concluded thus: 
"If we desire to see Spain lower her tariff, we 
cannot take surer steps to induce her to do so, than by 
suppressing smuggling at Gibraltar, and leaving to Spain 
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the time of her own commercial regeneration." 
It follows clearly enough from this consideration of 
the problem that smuggling was in fact a commercial weapon 
against Spain. This appears to have been the view of the British 
Government when on June 3rd 1882, in a Note signed by the 
Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain and sent to the Spanish 
Minister of State, no less a proposal was made than that the two 
Governments should negotiate a commercial treaty in which 
Spain would offer Great Britain mo st-favoured-nation treatment, 
and Great Britain would undertake to suppress smuggling at 
Gibraltar in return. 
Smuggling has 1n effect had that character throughout 
the 19th century and in the 20th to the present day. The Spanish 
"Red Book" gives figures for recent years in which smuggling 
based on the Rock amounted, as we said to a real economic cancer 
for Spain. By sea alone this illicit traffic in 1959 reached the 
figure of 1, 794 million pesetas, and it was carried on from the 
Rock, in that year, by 299 sorties of smuggling launches. Though 
Spanish repression gradually reduced these figures in the following 
years, in 1961 seaborne contraband still totalled 840 million, 
with 140 sorties, that is, an average of roughly eleven sorties 
a month. The Spanish Minister of Information and Tourism has 
stated publicly that the sum total of the losses caused by 
Gibraltar smuggling to the Spanish State in the years from 
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1961 to 1965 attained the figure of twelve million pounds sterling. 
We shall get a clear idea of the volume of clandestine traffic 
carried out from Gibraltar if we recall that the annual imports 
of American tobacco by Gibraltar - with its population of 25, 000 -
is 5, 048, 767 dollars, whereas the whole of Spain, with 32 million 
inhabitants, imports no more than 4, 779, 227 dollars" worth, and 
Germany, with 55 million inhabitants, imports only 2, 520, 183 
dollars" worth. 
Quite clearly this exaggerated importation of tobacco 
is made for the sole purpose of smuggling it into Spain. As a 
further testimony to its existence, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
is in possession of samples of sixteen brands of tobacco with 
labels printed in Spanish - brands which were in circulation at 
a time when those really manufactured in Spain were far fewer. 
The fact is that smuggling has been a logical outcome 
of the unnatural character of the human assemblage that resides 
at Gibraltar. Since it has not been capable of creating its own 
labour force, and the civilictn and military posts of the Base were 
filled, this floating collectivity, with no economic basis of its 
own and no definite range of professions, has drifted into illicit 
trade with Spain in order to enrich itself. 
h) Interdependence and 
inequality. 
But at the same time the inhabitants of Gibraltar 
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have inevitably had to fit into their natural economic background, 
namely the neighbouring economy of Spain. The voids created 
by Gibraltar as a Base have had to be filled up somehow or other, 
and in addition to illegal trade, an economic interdependence 
has arisen between Gibraltar and its Campo or hinterland. 
As a result of this, many inhabitants of Gibraltar 
established their residences in the Campo or other neighbouring 
parts of Spain - thus evading taxation by both countries -, 
acquired urban properties - there are Soo houses registered in 
their names in the Campo Zone - in addition to numerous rural 
estates which they entered in the names of third parties so as to 
escape fiscal obligations; and they also set up, in Spanish territory, 
prosperous business es of hotel-keeping, transport, etc. , thus 
creating an important current of outlet for Gibraltar into Spain, 
for economic reasons which redounded to their own profit. Mean-
while, no similar Spanish current into Gibraltar could ever be 
created, because the British laws - the 1873 Order in Council, 
the "Immigrants and Aliens Order" of 1885 or the "Gibraltarian 
Status Ordinance'' of 1962 - at all times prohibited residence 
on the Rock by Spaniards, who were only authorized, during all 
those years, to enter Gibraltar every day, for the mere purpose 
of working in the service of the British fortress. 
Again, Gibraltar"' s daily supplies, whether foodstuffs 
or building materials, have been dependent on the products of 
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Spain, and in this respect the Spanish statistics show very 
considerable figures; they prove that the Rock is part of a 
social and economic continuum which is naturally much larger 
than the perimeter of the Base and is the latter,. s real living 
space. A single fact is enough to prove this argument, clear 
as it is: in the town of Gibraltar, in 1964, there were 6, 869 
vehicles licensed to be driven on the roads (Gibraltar, 1964, 
Report of the Year), Clearly these vehicles are not used 
merely to carry Gibraltarians around the two square miles of 
the Rock and along its 1 zt miles of roads and streets. 
All that we have said about the economic complex 
of Gibraltar prove that its sole lawful and natural basis is 
Spain. This has also been recognized by the Manchester Guardian 
of May 11th 1950, when it stated, in referring to the economy of 
Gibraltar, that "the sole practical solution is to regard the 
su1 rounding area and Gibraltar as one economic unit". This 
undeniable fact makes it necessary to renovate completely such 
an economy, which has hitherto been nothing but a dead weight 
on Anglo-Spanish relations. 
National sentiments 
\Ve said earlier that Gi bral tar was not only a 
set of problems for Great Britain but also thc "proud fortress" 
symbolizing a past which still stirs the British soul. But it 
must also be said that Gibraltar is equally the syrnool of a 
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"proud nation 11 , namely Spain, who has never really accepted 
the present situation and who likewise has her own Gibraltarian 
tradition - the history of an outcry that has never ceased, 
against what she regards as an historical wrong. 
Spain is unanimous. 
A contrast. 
Concerning this sentiment, Spanish op1n1on has 
been totally unanimous. Spaniards of every political ideology 
and every social class have always coincided in a reclamation 
which, in the course of 262 years, has taken the form of three 
military sieges, thousands of combatants killed, innumerable 
diplomatic approaches, numerous conversations between 
statesmen, six attempts at exchange, and a vast, unanimous 
bibliography, which is the most important moral force behind 
the Spanish Government at the moment of these conversations. 
Perhaps British readers may find special significance and 
effectiveness in some words written by Salvador de Madariaga, 
who was then the representative of Spain at the Leagua of Nations, 
in a Report to the Spanish Minister of State. The document is 
on the files of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When referring 
to a conversation he had with Mr Anthony Eden (as he then was), 
Sefior Madariaga states that he dealt 11 once more with the 
matter of the occupation of a territory so obviously national 
as Gibraltar, reminding him that this was not an island of more 
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or less debatable nationality such as Malta, but a piece of 
unquestionably Spanish national territory, a unique case in 
European geography". This Spanish unanimity, which emphasizes 
that the problem is permanently alive, contrasts with the fact 
that, like a sort of counterpoint, there have always been, on the 
British side, free and open minds which have been capable of 
comprehending the Spaniards" feelings and thereby bringing 
out the injustice of the situation. More than a century ago, a 
man so incapable of disloyalty and so well acquainted with the 
facts as the British Governor of Gibraltar, Sir Robert Gardiner, 
used these words: 
"What must be the feelings of every Spaniard, with 
this noble Rock for ever in view, occupied by strangers? 
Our own feelings, as we reach the deep shade of its high 
summit, in returning from our daily course into Spain, 
teaches us what those of a Spaniard must be." 
A few years later an eminent British statesman, 
John Bright, actually proposed in a speech that Gibraltar should 
be ceded to Spain, and declared that the Rock had been captured 
by Great Britain when she was not at war with Spain and "retained 
against every law of morality and honour" ("The war and the supply 
of cotton", Birmingham, 18 December 1862, "Speeches on questions 
of public policy"). 
In our own day the eminent British historian, Sir 
Charles Petrie, who has written pages showing a great understanding 
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of the Gibraltar problem, has recognized that "British occupation 
of Gibraltar has been a running sore for Spaniards ever since its 
original seizure". (Introduction to the book 11 Gibraltar" by Jose 
Pla; Hollis and Carter, London, 19 55). The same has been 
recognized by a historian of the prestige of Arnold Toynbee, whom 
we have already quoted, and even by a British Member of Parliament, 
Mr Wyatt, who stated in the House of Commons on December 20th 
1961, with remarkable frankness: 11 I think General Franco has a 
perfect right to claim Gibraltar, but I hope that we are strong 
enough to resist him. 11 
And even the compilers of the 11 Encyclopaedia 
Britannica11 , in its 1879 edition, when speaking of the occupation 
of Gibraltar by British troops, had written: 
11It is hardly to the honour of England that it was 
unprincipled enough to sanction and ratify the occupation11 • 
We have examined the accumulation of military 
demographic and economic processes which have originated and 
developed from Gibraltar and the effects of all kinds that they 
have had on Spain. They are the inevitable result of the alien 
enclave of the Rock, and they all imperiously demand a radical 
solution wihout loss of time. That is why we are here: to 
negotiate about them; and any objective examination of the 
problem must necessarily take into account this unanimity of 
Spanish feelings on the claim to Gibraltar. 
The Second Gibraltar: 
a) The British occupation 
of the isthmus 
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But there is one very grave problem that is not in 
itself a logical outcome of the Gibraltar enclave, and concerning 
which the only thing to be done is to restore the situation immediately 
to its original terms. I refer to the British advance on the Isthmus 
of Gibraltar, to the north of the fortifications that enclosed the Town 
in 1 704, and hence outside the limits conceded to England in the 
Treaty of Utrecht. This has been a pure and simple British 
invasion of Spanish territory which, although militarily neutralized 
by the free decision of Spain, was and still is, entirely Spanish 
sovereign territory, and in which Great Britain has built the 
present airfield of Gibraltar. The Treaty of Utrecht can give 
legal grounds for a British presence which has proved, in essence, 
a usurpation and has moreover evolved through so many violations 
of its original legal intentions that it makes these conversations 
indispensable today; but what the Treaty can most certainly not 
justify is the occupation and utilization, by the abusive employrrient 
of force, of Spanish territory outside that which was ceded at 
Utrecht. Upon this point there cannot be any shadow of doubt; 
neither is it possible to plead any right of prescription to consolidate 
a permanently illegal situation, and I will say why. In addition to 
prescription being a debatable and vague institution, both in 
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judicial decisions and in doctrine - which I will not go into here, 
though I admit I am tempted to do so in my capacity as a Professor 
of International Law -, in addition to that, I say, the following 
is evident, even to those who accept prescription: in order 
that prescription may produce legal effects it is necessary to 
take into account the behaviour of both the interested parties; 
in other words, the indifference or tacit abandonment on the 
part of one side, and the occupation as owner on the part of the 
other. And that is something that has certainly not occurred 
here. The Spanish Goverment has continually declared that its 
acts of tolerance did not imply any extension of the concessions 
made in the Treaty of Utrecht, and the Government of Great 
Britain has repeatedly as sured it that in their actions there 
was no intention of altering the "status quo ante". Consequently 
it is not possible to speak of any legitimization of the British 
presence in part of the neutral ground, by reason of the long 
series of Spanish protests and refusals which have been made 
uninterruptedly from 1713 down to the present day. These are 
presented, with documents, in the Spanish "Red Bock", and they 
incontrovertfbly prove Spain"' s unchanging attitude of not ceding 
her rights in a zone belonging to her exclusive sovereign competence. 
In short, to apply to our case the words of a former 
legal advisor to the Foreign Office, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in his 
lectures at The Hague Academy of International Law (Recueil des 
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Cours, 92-1957, II, 146): "such acts, far from conferring 
tit le, are merely violations of another State" s sovereignty and 
are simply attempts at an illegal usurpation of title". The same 
holds good for the British expansion over some waters in 
Algeciras Bay which are waters corning under unquestionable 
Spanish competence, and in which there is no alternative to 
a strict respect for that competence. 
The Spanish "Red Book" of 1965 describes the 
pretexts which were employed by Great Britain in order to 
advance 8 50 rnetr es in a straight line northwards, o c cupy1ng 
roughly a square kilometre of Spanish sovereign territory in 
the isthmus. Great Britain used every means, from the deceit 
by which she blew up the Spanish forts facing the Rock, to the 
humanitarian motives put forward on the occasion of epidemics 
in the Town, to continue advancing her positions and encampments, 
interspersed with absurd discussions about the position of sentry-
boxes, and crowning her ilegal encroachment by erecting the 
so -called fence which was set up in 1909 and which, like another 
11
wall of sharne 11 , separates Spain from a piece of her own 
territory. 
b) An emergency 
airfield. 
The construction, already mentioned, of the Gibraltar 
aerodrome within that territory, has military implications which 
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aggravate an invasion that was of itself inadmissible. In 1939, 
a year after the <'lirfield was constructed during Spain,. s 
difficult n1oments of tlH civil war, the British Government, 
replying to the Spanish protests, said that it was merely a 
question of ''an emergency landing ground" (Memorandum of 
the Foreign Office, attached to the dispatch of the Spanish 
Ambassador in London of May 17th 19 39), But this "emergency 
landing ground" was ... onsolidated, and became a key piece in 
British strategy, a point of support for the Allied military 
machine in the Second World War, and finally - if not juridically, 
at least in fact - a very important element, like the Base as a 
whole, in the structure of NATO, a fact which has obliged 
Spain to take the measures about overflights to which we have 
already referred. Captain Alan Hillgarth, who was the 
British Naval Attache at Madrid during the war and who was 
specially praised by Winston Churchill in his Memoirs ("Their 
Finest Hour") for his "profound knowledge of Spanish Affairs'', 
in a letter on the subject of this airfield to the Daily Telegraph 
nf Anril 28th l9SS, wrote among other things: "The airstrip is 
on th<:· so-called nvutr,d ground, whi ~h strict observance of 
the spirit of the treaties should logically have left inviolate. 
The ext n ion into Algeciras. Bay is so directed that it infringes 
on water which is not even neutral but definitely Spanish." In 
the same letter, realizing the precarious character of Gibraltar 
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because of modern conditions and through its own development and 
enlar gem en ts, Capt. Hillgarth emphasized its vulnerability, saying: 
11 Gibraltar itself is only feasible as a modern base with Spanish 
consent. 
The port and ;·i rstrip are completely vulnerable." 
c) The s e r1ousne s s 
of a frontier pro bl em. 
The advance up the Isthmus is a genuine 11 frontier 
question'', with all the gravity that such questions imply. It is 
one on which Spain cannot give way, and which in its elf alone 
would justify international action. Frontiers are either zones 
of collaboration and friendship under a legal order, or else 
zones of violence; and in Gibraltar, Spain cannot accept 
anything that is not either a free agreement between the parties 
or a removal of the pr esent British line back to its original 
position. 
It is also necessary to repeat here that any measure 
whil h Spain mny take in this respect, or in any other of the matters 
that <l1nstitut1· the problem of Cihr ;dtar. cannot in any way be 
described <15 a policy of <lgg r<'ssion or a measure of retort. Any 
such n1 ea s u r e wi 11 be n1 e r d y , L r E' tu r n to no rm a lit y, that i s to say, 
to the existing norm. to the lC'gal position irom which Gibraltar 
has ~ecn steadily departing throughout the years. It will be the 
redress of a situation damaged by the British violations of the 
... 
Treaty of Utrecht and by the unnatural-not to say pathological-
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evolution of Gibraltar. For if the Treaty of Utrecht is a legal 
instrument that needs renovation, its 10th Article is fully in force, 
and in addition to certain rights, it lays down certain obligations 
which must also be complied with. It would be senseless that 
Article 10 should have a one-way validity only, that is to say, to 
justify the British presence at Gibraltar, but should be invalid 
in the other sense, namely that of the limitation it imposes, and 
the Spanish rights and interests it expressly protects. This would 
be a legal monstruosity which Spain cannot accept. 
Here, then, in broad lines, expressed bluntly but 
sincerely is the problem of Gibraltar as seen through Spanish 
eyes. It is not a fictitious problem but a real one; it is not the 
reclamation of a political regime, but the demand of an entire 
people. Neither Great Britain nor Spain could ignore or evade 
it any longer, and that is why we are here today. 
Firmness and 
Friendship. 
As I said in my speech of December 20th 1965 to the 
Spanish Cortes, Spain approaches this problem in a firm and 
friendly spirit. We knov.. we have behind us a unanimous people 
and we are also encouraged by world public opinion, eloquently 
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expressed by the United Nations. But we who are here today 
represent two great European peoples, experienced and mature, 
who may sometimes have been rivals because of that very 
greatness; but who are bound also by many old friendships, and 
who belong to the same historic community. We would be 
betraying our µresent mission if we were not capable of 
putting aside r:tn' psycl rn logical obstacle or ideological prejudice 
standing in the way of a friendly and peaceful understanding. 
Let us not delay, let us not invent artificial pretexts such as 
supposedly incompatible political systems; for such distinctions 
are usually as unprofitable as in the case of the Spanish politician 
Sagasta, who on the advent of the I Republic naively attempted 
to get the British to give Gibraltar back to Spain saying that 
there no longer existed the obstacle of the Spanish Monarchy, 
and that the country was now "Bourbonless Spain". 
Let us not waste our time when the question is 
so clear. The opportunity beckons because of many factors: not 
only an elementary sense of political usefulness, but also the 
possibility of strengthening Gibraltar" s positiop with the full 
weight of Spanish friendship and with an area of cooperation that 
would be of fundamental importance for Europe; we can also 
think of our evergrowing comrnercial relations as a symbol of 





I wish to remark at this point that while Great 
Britain has been our principal client over many years, although 
Germany has now gone ahead, Spain is also an important market 
for Great Britain. According to figures given in the Official 
British publication "Overseas Trade Accounts of the United 
Kingdom" (December 1965), British exports to Spain were 
f.. 96. 314, 000 in 1965, an increase of 300 per cent since 1952, 
the increase having been constant, from£ 24, 341, 254, in 1952 
to f.. 40, 511, 000 in 1961, with a further increase as mentioned 
up to 1965. On the other hand, Spanish exports to Great Britain 
reached£ 74, 021, 000 which gives a favourable balance to British 
exports of £22, 293. 000. 
Soain is hopeful that Great Britain, whose political 
talent and genius has enabled her to liquidate so many colonial 
situations, facing problems even more complicated than this one, 
- even through the trials of war - may also avoid what Salisbury 
called: "the commonest error in politics: sticking to the 
carcases of dead policies". We hope that the British Govern-
ment, with its clarity of vision, will be guided by the words of 
the Prime Minister Mr Harold Wilson in his book "Purpose 
in politics" (Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 1964, pag 7): 
Sp a n i sh o ff e r s 
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"I believe we are on the eve of a new greatness 
for Britain, a greatness based not on military oppression 
or the ability to mount a colonial expedition, not on economic 
imperialism or colonialism, but on a contribution we have it 
in our unique power to make to the peace and happiness of 
mankind. A contri bution based not on separatism, or 
nationalism, or on out - dated concepts of sovereignty, 
but on leadership in an inter- dependent world." 
When we think of this problem of Gibraltar w hich is 
in essence so easy to solve, we expect a gesture of understanding 
or th e part of Great Brita i n . We for our own part are ready 
to me e t h e r half-way , in a spirit of generosity' which we a re 
prepared to carry thr o u g h to its maximum limit. 
In view of th e s e hopes and intentions, the Spanish 
Go vPrnment r eali ses that the r e is only one definite solution 
t he G ibral tar probl ern: The o n e recommended by the resolution 
~>f thC' CnitPd Nation s , and m<lde n ec es sary by the true pr e sent 
situa ti on of G i b r a ltar which we have described. 
T he Con ::;cnSU;-, of the C omn1itte of Twenty-four 
noted thE> e xistenc' of a disp' t b e tween Spain and the United 
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Kingdom over the status and situation of the territory of Gibraltar, 
and clearly defined, as we have seen, the two key factors of the 
colonial problem of Gibraltar. On the one hand, the administering 
power, Great Britain, and on the other, the nation colonized on a 
part of its territory: Spain. The Committee entrusted to these 
two countries the authentic decolonization of the Rock, and they 
were to ·bear in mind the interests of the inhabitants of the territory; 
for though the Committee did not recognize them as a people legally 
endowed with the right to self-determination, neither did it want 
to make them the exclusive victims of this final colonial phase. 
Spain shares these wishes; she wants to avoid the consequences 
for them of a persistent colonialism which would oblige our country 
to take self-protective measures. 
The United Nations decided in favour of a negotiation 
.. 
between the colonized nation and the colonizing power, and at the 
same time pointed out the way for a rightful solution of the problem: 
To apply to it the Declaration on the granting of independence to 
colonial nations and peoples, contained in Resolution 1514 approved 
by the XV General Assembly. 
The United Nations have denied self-determination 
to the inhabitants of the Rock; Spain does not admit the possibility 
that these inhabitants should have at their disposal a piece of 
Spanish territory; the British Government is aware that the 
Gibraltarians lack a sufficient political entity to enable them to 
take part in these negotiations, as admitted in the House of Commons 
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by the Colonial Secretary on May 5th. Therefore, the only 
principle applicable to the Colonial situation of Gibraltar is 
paragraph 6 of the aforementioned Resolution 1514 (XV) which 
says literally: 
11 6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total 
disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity 
of a country is incompatible wich the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations." 
Certain countries in the Committee of Twenty-four 
laid stress on the need to apply this paragraph; they were Uruguay, 
Venezuela, .Syria, Tunis, Mali and Irak, and only the represent-
ative of Australia, a Commonwealth country, expressed some 
doubts; his stand in the United Nations was that the Gibraltarians 
were the exclusive masters of their future, a position far in 
advance of what the Gibraltarians themselves want or Great 
Britain is prepared to grant them. 
The United Nations therefore recommend the 
restoration of the national unity and territorial integrity of Spain 
as a means to ensure the end of the Colonial problem on our soil. 
This also is what Spain asks for: The cancellation through cord al 
and sincere negotiations with Great Britain of Article 10 of the 
Treaty of Utrecht of July 17th 1913 by which our national unity 
was disrupted and our territory amputated. 
a) A present-day 
Base. 
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Spain upholds this solution not merely as a territorial 
claim which would objectively, in its own right, be worthy of taking 
into account. Present-day Gibraltar, as we have seen, must 
necessarily violate the Spanish military and economic space in 
a thousand different ways: because otherwise it would suffocate . 
..1:'..,ven with the best will in the world, Great Britain, though she 
alone is responsible for what happens on the Rock, cannot avoid 
the consequences - however foreseeable - of having an active 
military and economic stronghold set in the midst of the Spanish 
national community. B~t Spain is the exclusive victim of these 
consequences; so she cannot take into consideration any guarantee 
~:1at Gibrc.Jtar will not deve~op in a manner har.rnful to Spain, 
because she knows by experience that the 0!'it:~ah Government 
has never been able to make such a guara.ntee effective to the 
full c:;atisfaction of n1y country. 
Any other formula for Gibraltar that ignores these 
facts could only be successful with a completely passive Government 
resigned to have on Spanisl1 soil a foreign sovereign power with a 
say in Spain" s desti:1y which could subvert Spanish sovereignty 
not only on the Rock but in the country as a whole. In 262 years 
there has bee~1 no Spanish Govel'nrnent willing to accept this si-
~ation, and I dare to prophesy 1.hat there will never be. Either 
through weakness or through the stress of circumstances, there 
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have been silent Governments or Governments disposed only 
to put a momentary brake on the national aspirations. But these 
have never been renounced to; not by any regime, nor by any 
sector whatsoever of Spanish politics. 
Nor could a shared sovereignty be considered a 
fair and rightful solution, because it would leave in the hands 
of the Gibraltarians a control of Anglo-Spanish relations. 
Stern economic needs would oblige the future inhabitants of the 
Rock, uncertain as to where their allegiance lay, to try and 
keep Spain and the United Kingdom in a state of permanent 
rivalry, a situation which would not be improved by the probable 
efforts of other Powers who might think it in their interest to 
prevent the development of a sincere and lasting friendship 
between London and Madrid. 
I must repeat that the British sovereignty over a 
piece of our territory is based on the status of Gibraltar, 
established bilaterally by Spain and Great Britain in Article 10 
of the Treaty of Utrecht of 1 713, as was admitted by the British 
Delegation to the Committee of Twenty-four and in the IV Com-
mission of the XX General Assembly, when they made "status" 
and "sovereignty" synonymous in their addresses of September 
11th 1963, September 23rd and October 16th, 1964 and 
November 16th, December 1st and 7th, 1965. 
The United Nations have invited Spain and the 
United Kingdom to put an end to the dispute about the status 
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of Gibraltar which is by now anachronistic, as the Prime 
Minister, Mr Wilson, quite rightly pointed out in the House 
of Commons on April 29th 1966. My country therefore considers 
that the moment has come to cancel article 10 of the Treaty of 
Utrecht through friendly and sincere negotiations, as this 
article is the basis of an old-fashioned idea of sovereignty 
which has given rise to the colonial situation of Gibraltar. Our 
territorial integrity and National unity will thus be restored 
and the old and bitter quarrel which divides us will be at last 
surmounted. 
I think that this opportunity now presented to us of 
being, so to speak, taken by the hand by the United Nations 
should not be cast aside. We hope that Great Britain will not 
give an example, which is all too easy to follow, of disregarding 
or misapplying the Recommendation of the United Nations. 
We understand perfectly that in considering this 
solution there arises also a vital interest for the United King-
dom: the need to meet military undertakings that in modern 
times - it is only proper for us to admit it - are rather the 
results of your country" s cooperation in a common defensive 
effort, than of a selfish imperialism that would now be irrelevant. 
Although during the debates of the Committee of Twenty-four 
various members of the United Nations have cast doubts on the 
legitimacy of Great Britain" s military interests in Gibraltar, 
the Spanish Government considers that they ought to be taken into 
account, and is prepared to give thern formal recognition. 
r----
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Such a recognition would not contradict the Charter 
of the United Nations. that admits the possibility of Agreements 
in benefit of a common security when their aim is to maintain 
peace in specific areas of the world. 
In the consideration given by the United Nations 
to the decolonization of Gibraltar, both the Consensus of the 
Committee of Twenty-four and the General Assembly Resolution 
that ratifies it, pr·ovide freedom of action for Spain and the 
United Kingdom to agree on the best manner of protecting and 
coordinating these military interests. 
The Declaration of the British Government of 
1966 on the Military Budgets says briefly that "the garrison, 
the Arsenal and other establishments 11 will be maintained in 
Gibraltar. 
It would not be difficult for Spain to agree to the 
continuation in Gibraltar of the deiensive military establishment. 
However, if this British military effort in Spain were to remain 
disconnected from the common defensive background, this would 
be in co n t rad i c ti on o f th i ck ;1 s in t ht~ \V hi t e Book on !) v i en s L. : f o r 
you would then have d t'ry expensive and inefficient 8<1S('. <1 
sort of old-fashioned bastion at the service of purpoSL'S tu which 
the British Gov rnment says it has renounced for ever. 
It would seem advisable to think of this matter 
courageously and decisively in up-to-date terms and to consider 
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a wider form of cooperation between our two countries, for which 
we find a good examole ii the Spanish-American Bases jointly 
utilized, which resulted from the Agreement signed between Spain 
and the United States in 1953 and which over the years have shown 
their soundness and efficiency. 
It is not for nothing that the Iberian Peninsula has 
such an essential role in the security of the Strait of Gibraltar. 
These few names: Gibraltar and Rota in Spain, Alverca and Beja 
in Portugal, are the real coordinates of a strategy extensively 
covering the entry to the Mediterranean, which is needful of Spanish 
air space, which is perhaps the most useful training ground for the 
air forces of the Western world in E.:urope, but which cannot be 
used without the cooperation of Spain, a cooperatic;n which it will 
be logically difficult to provide while the present arbitrary situation 
of Gibraltar continues. 
These realities of the situation, which trct.nscend the 
specific problem of Gibraltar and to a. certain extent leave it on a 
secondary plane in the light of the present international scene, are 
not ignored by the Spanish Government. But the S 1J3.nieh Government 
is not prepared to accept risks without the cor1·esponding benefits, 
merely to satisfy the selfishness of others and to the detriment of 
Spanish security. These are matters. which deserve to be deeply 
considered at a later and proper moment. 
b) International guarantees 
for the inhabitants. 
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In considering the fair solution to the problem which 
the United Nations exclusively recommends and which meets the 
facts of the case, and which, as we have seen, naturally implies 
the need to cancel Article 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht, a second 
element arises which the United Nations has also advised us to 
protect and respect: the interests of the present inhabitants of 
the territory. 
From an economic point of view it is obvious that 
they are closely bound to Spain. All the efforts carried out since 
last year to create in Gibraltar an "island economy" independent 
of the Spanish economy, have so far failed, and they can only 
succeed through massive financial grants to the Rock, deriving 
entirely from the British Budget. If my country does not contribute 
to achieving a high standard of living for the Rock - and this she 
cannot do if we do not reach an Anglo-Spanish understanding -
the high standard of living will either be paid for in good measure 
by the British tax payer, or will have to be considerably reduced. 
Lord Merrivale on March 9th 1966, quoted some figures in the 
House of Lords to explain the losses suffered by the economy of 
Gibraltar through some Spanish measures which consisted merely 
in cancelling certain facilities which had been a profitable boon 
for smugglers. The figures he quoted were sufficiently explicit 
to realize that an economic regime independent of Spain offers 
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very scarce possibilities to the inhabitants of the Rock. 
From a demographic point of view, only Spain 
can offer the Gibraltarians a normal area of expansion, which 
they lack on the Rock, unless they prefer to set themselves a 
population limit. 
Individually the inhabitants are linked to the 
British Crown by their British nationality and its legal 
consequences. 
It is very difficult for Spain to define "a priori" 
what are the interests of the inhabitants of the Rock which we 
must take into account in this negotiation. To judge by the 
statements of their representatives to the Committee of Twenty-
four, and by many other statements made during 1965 and the 
present year, on e obtains the imoression that they wish to 
maintain a close association with the United Kingdom, in whom 
it appears that they see the only guarantee for some interests 
which they have never really defined publicly with t he necessary 
clarity or pr 'cision. But at the same time, from their petition 
to the British Government; fron1 their stat n1ents in th Unit (' <i 
Nations to which we have referred; and from others in the 
international Pr ss, it an be clearly deduced that the inhabitants 
of the Rock also wish to maintain close links with Spain, although 
they have accused her recently of creating economic and other 
difficulties, and of destroying the interdependence between the 
Rock and adjoining territory; an interdep e ndence which, we should 
add, has so far developed only to the detriment of the Spanish 
economy and sovereignty. 
It is very difficult, we repeat, to try and define at 
this stage of the negotiations the tn.1e interests of the present in-
habitants of the Rock. No one better than the inhabitants th ~m se lv e s 
could explain their needs to Spain through the British Government 
that represents them, once they are convinced that the possible 
solution to the problem of Gibraltar is at the sarne time the only 
one which offers them a guarantee for the future. 
In so far as my country is concerned, it is enough 
to say that, except for the right to have at her disposal a piece 
of her own territory, Spain is prepared to consider the most 
generous for~'lulae for establishing the most adequate legal regime 
for the defense of the interests of the inhabitants as indicated by 
the United Nations; this legal regime would be fully guara nt eed 
by an Anglo-Spanish Convention registered in the United Nati o ns 
according to Article 102 of the Charter, the en<lctment of which 
would therefore be protected by the United Nations. 
This Convention would establish a Personal Statute, 
in which, in addition to other basic rights - such as freedom of 
religion - the British nationality of the present inhabitants oi 
Gibraltar would be respected, and their right of residence be 
guaranteed, as also the free exercise of their lawful activities, and 
c) A healthy and 
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their permanence in their place of work. Also, Spain is prepared 
to grant a special Charter to Gibraltar that will integrate the 
interests of the present inhabitants with those of the rest of the 
Campo, by means of an administrative organization and an 
economic and financial system based on a Free Port regime, 
which would give rise to a considerable development of the whole 
region through its cooperation with the neighbouring territory. 
developing economy. 
We are making our proposal, not only because we 
wish to meet the requirements of the United Nations and to do 
this as generously as possible, but also because the Spanish 
Government has the firm intention of associating Gibraltar to 
the great enterprise, which has already begun, of developping 
economically the whole zone of the Campo; of restoring its unity 
and making it in a short time a rich and flourishing region, which 
will have as its centre a great city in the Bay of Algeciras, that 
is to link up the dispersed urban centres of Gibraltar, La L:lnea, 
San Roque, Los Barrios and Algeciras. 
No matter whether Gibraltar becomes integrated 
with this vast urban complex or whether the Rock becomes definitely 
isolated, Spain has in any case engaged herself on this project on 
her honour, and she will carry it out. 
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For if on the one hand Great Britain has obligations 
towards the present inhabitants of the Rock, Spain also has very 
serious obligations towards the inhabitants of the Campo de 
Gibraltar and especially of La Linea and San Roque. We have 
to fill in the deplorable economic vacuum that sorrounded the 
Rock in former times, the "glacis" of Gibraltar, the depressed 
area which was nothing but a passive labour market for the Base. 
We must substitute all this with a prosperous 
region in one of the crucial zones of the Mediterranean. San 
Roque, where live the descendants of the old Spanish population 
of the Rock, who have been gazing for two and a half centuries 
at their lost hoµies; La L1nea, the humble camp of a community 
of daily exiles, of pariahs at the service of an old-fashioned 
caoitalist regime: these townships, like the rest ·of the Campo, 
deserve a historic compensation. Many things have changed in 
the region of Gibraltar, and one of them is the Spanish resolve 
to find a permanent remedy for a colonial situation, and to give 
a region whose situation should have made it one of the most 
flourishing in modern Spain, - the position and wealth that it never 
attained because it was a victim of one of those imperialist 
situations which Mr Wilson mentioned in the quotation we have 
referred to. 
We have described with full clarity from the 
beginning the factors that must be taken into consideration for 
the only possible solution that can be given to the problem of 
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Gibraltar, and have avoided for this negotiation the classical 
gambits of diplomatic bargaining and compromise. Precisely 
because we are dealing with such serious matters as the integrity 
of Spain, the military security of the free world and the interests 
of human beings who should not be made to pay for situations that 
they have no power to remedy, it seems to us that any bargaining 
over the principles of the solution should in all honesty be excluded. 
d) Formal proposal. 
In view of all these considerations, Spain proposes to 
the Government of Great Britain that a Convention should be signed, 
the First Article of which should contain the cancellation of Arti'cle 10 
of the Treaty of Utrecht of 1 713 and the restoration of the national 
unity and territorial integrity of Spain through the reversion of 
Gibraltar, thus complying with the mandate of the United Nations. 
In the Second Article my Count~y would accept the 
presence at Gibraltar of a British Military Base whose structure, 
legal situation, and coordination with the defense organization of 
Spain or the Free World would be the subject of a negotiation for 
a especial Agreement to be attached to the Convention we are 
proposing. 
Spain proposes a Third Article stipulating that a legal 
regime to protect the interests of the present citizens of Gibraltar 
should be the subject of an additional Anglo-Spanish agreement 
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registered in the United Nations, as has been stated. In 
this agreement, in ac dition to the appropriate economic and 
administrative formulae, a Personal Statute would be 
established, by which, among other fundamental rights - such 
as freedom of religion - the British nationality of the present 
inhabitants of Gibraltar would be respected, and their right 
of residence would be guaranteed, as also the free exercise 
of their lawful activities, and a guarantee of permanence in 
their place of work. 
Finally in a Fourth Article, it would be specified 
that this Convention will be effective after the two additional 
agreements to which reference has been made in the Second 
and Third Articles, shall have been signed and registered in 
the United Nations. 
Thus, the peace of the world will be reinforced, 
with the commencement of a new era in Anglo-Spanish relations. 
